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ABsTrAcT
Western countries, including Scandinavian nations, have witnessed an increase in wage inequality 
over the past decades. Recent studies attribute rising wage inequality in the United States and 
United Kingdom primarily to between-occupation inequality, while changes in within-occupation 
wage inequality were less important for the overall growth. We investigate this hypothesis in the 
Norwegian context. Our results show a slight increase in inequality from 2003 to 2012, mostly 
accounted for by between-occupational wage inequality. Occupations became a more important 
determinant of wages, but the increase in total wage inequality was small. In order to explain 
trends in wage inequality, we turn to three occupational characteristics: licensure, unionization, and 
credentialization. 
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Introduction
Most western countries have witnessed increasing inequality in wage income and wealth in recent decades (Piketty, 2014; Stiglitz, 2012). This trend holds true even in Scandinavian countries, such as Norway, albeit from comparably low inequal-
ity levels (Cholezas & Tsakloglou, 2009; Markussen & Røed, 2016; Mastekaasa, 2011;). 
Here, we study the role of occupations in this development. Occupations are often seen 
as the backbone of the class structure (e.g., Goldthorpe, 1987, p. 29) and are central to 
most studies on social inequality and social stratification (e.g., Weeden & Grusky, 2005), 
to operationalizations of social class (e.g., Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1993; Oesch, 2006; 
Wright, 1997), and to scales of socioeconomic status (e.g., Prandy, 1990). If occupations 
are this crucial to life chances and social inequalities, they probably have played some 
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role in the development toward increasing wage differences. Researchers have established 
that the rise in wage inequality in the United States (US) (Mouw & Kalleberg, 2010) and 
United Kingdom (UK) (Williams, 2013) is found primarily between occupations, with 
slower growth of within-occupation wage inequality (Mouw & Kalleberg, 2010).
Rising wage inequality has numerous explanations. Stiglitz (2012) highlights 
rent-seeking activities as an important explanation for the rising wage gap. While 
there are different ways by which rents are accrued, an important mechanism is via 
creating a monopoly on a service or product (Weeden & Grusky, 2014). Occupa-
tional licenses are one example on how to create a monopoly on occupational tasks 
(Stiglitz, 2012, p. 54).1 This article examines how three institutions of occupational 
closure affect wage inequality in Norway. More specifically, we investigate how occu-
pational licensure, credentialization, and unionization correlate with the (growing) 
earnings differences between and within occupations and in different parts of the 
income distribution. Our hypothesis is that closure institutions increase the average 
wage levels in occupations and equalize the distribution of residual inequality within 
occupations.
The current article complements previous research in two ways. First, it provides 
evidence on the trends in between- and within-occupation wage inequality in Norway, 
where this decomposition has not previously been performed. Both the US and UK are 
liberal market economies, whereas Norway has a coordinated market economy with 
lower overall inequality levels and a centralized bargaining system. 
Second, we examine the role of licensure, credentialization, and union density for 
between- and within-occupation wage inequality. Research on occupational closure doc-
uments higher average wage levels from licensure and union density in the US (Humphris 
et al., 2010; Kleiner & Krueger, 2010; Weeden, 2002), the UK (Bol & Weeden, 2015; 
Humphris et al., 2010), Germany (Bol & Weeden, 2015), and Norway (Bol & Drange, 
2016). The effects of these institutions on (changes in) aggregate wage inequality, how-
ever, remain unexplored. 
We analyze public administrative register data on the working population from 
2003 to 2012 to investigate the role of occupational closure in the development of 
overall wage inequality and in different parts of the wage distribution. Most research 
on occupational closure uses cross-sectional data, although wage setting is a dynamic 
process with power relations that likely shift over time with economic conditions. Lon-
gitudinal data reveal whether these institutions have an active or passive role in wage 
development: do these institutions simply maintain higher average wage levels, or do 
they generate continuously accumulating wage benefits?
The Norwegian context
The Norwegian labor market, similar to other Nordic countries’ labor markets, is char-
acterized by strong peak organizations and centrally coordinated collective-bargaining 
systems. Employment rates are comparably high, and union density is high. However, 
changes have occurred over time. The share of union members in the Norwegian work-
force declined from 57% to 52% in the period under study (Nergaard et al., 2015). The 
decline of unionization varies considerably among occupations, potentially affecting the 
development of overall inequality. In recent years, peak associations for professional 
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labor have pushed for—and partly succeeded in—shifting from centralized wage bar-
gaining to local and individual-level wage bargaining. In other words, individualization, 
to some extent, is replacing solidarity in wage formation in higher-paying occupations. 
Even so, Norway still has a relatively strong collective-bargaining system with central-
ized negotiation. All public-sector employees and 75% of private-sector employees are 
covered by collective agreements. Norwegian unions form at the occupational level, espe-
cially among paraprofessional and professional occupations. A central element of the 
bargaining system is thus inter-union bargaining, as unions compete for the distribution 
of pay increases, and several unions can represent occupational interests (Fennefoss & 
Høgsnes, 2008).
Another important feature of Norwegian culture and society is the strong 
egalitarian tradition favoring small wage differences. Norwegian culture has been 
described as putting a strong emphasis on equality defined as sameness (Gullestad, 
1992), and the Norwegian labor market is characterized by a relatively compressed 
wage structure (Barth et al., 2003). Even in comparisons to other Scandinavian coun-
tries, Norwegians consider their own country to be highly egalitarian (Hjellbrekke & 
Korsnes, 2014: 56).
During 2003 to 2012, Norway was characterized by strong economic expansion 
and was not as affected by the financial crisis (2008–2009) as many other European 
and western countries (Dale-Olsen & Østbakken, 2016). Instead, Norway has had real 
wage growth and low unemployment levels throughout the period. These trends imply 
that more rents can be extracted during prosperous times than in meagre times, perhaps 
more obvious in relation to unions, which have a formalized role in wage bargaining, 
than in credentialization and licensure. Alternatively, a general undersupply of labor 
might support high labor prices overall and prevent the growth of inequality.
Although relatively low, wage inequalities in Norway are still substantial. 
Mastekaasa (2011) documents low but rising inequality in Norway from 1975 to 2004, 
entirely within the upper range of the wage distribution. This development contin-
ues into the next decade, through 2012 (Dale-Olsen & Østbakken, 2016). Dale-Olsen 
and Østbakken (2016) find that the increasing income difference in the top end of 
the income distribution is more marked when they analyze the broadest income mea-
sure (which also includes income from capital). They also find more inequality among 
men than among women. Mastekaasa’s (2011) analyses reveal stable patterns of wage 
inequality between groups with different educational levels in Norway. The observed 
increase in overall inequality, thus, stems from rising within-group wage inequality 
among those with tertiary education. Mastekaasa (2011) hypothesize that normative 
pressure for equality in Norway concentrates on maintaining small between-group dif-
ferences, so within-group variations in the top ends of the wage and education hierar-
chies escape public attention. Mastekaasa (2011) attributes the lack of increased dif-
ferences in the lower end of the wage distribution to the country’s collective-bargaining 
system. More recently, Jordfald and Nymoen (2016) show that wage growth in the 
lower wage decile over the past decade lags behind the rest of the workforce. Workers 
in the lower wage decile are typically young, labor migrants with a low probability of 
union membership. Unskilled occupations in sales and services are overrepresented in 
the lower wage segment. Therefore, we expect to find increasing inequality both in the 
upper and lower ends of the wage distribution. 
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occupational closure and wage inequalities
Wage inequality might be due to several factors. Conventional labor market economics 
(human capital theory) argues that wages are set according to workers’ marginal pro-
ductivity. A different perspective on (the increasing variations in) wage returns empha-
sizes different forms of rent seeking (Sørensen, 1998; Stiglitz, 2012). In the labor market, 
occupational closure is a major form of rent seeking.
Occupational closure theory argues that occupations are the central unit of social 
stratification because they constitute the basis for organizing economic group inter-
ests (e.g., increasing wages and improving working conditions). Occupations include 
people with similar education or training, similar work tasks and employment condi-
tions, similar social class and life chances, and similar interests (Jonsson et al., 2009; 
Williams, 2013, p. 843). Closure theory builds on Weber’s (1978, pp. 339–355) account 
of economic relationships among organized groups. He addresses the monopolization of 
resources and closure against competition from outsiders, citing the medieval guilds as 
typical examples of such behavior (Weber, 1978). Modern-day professions can be seen 
as the successors of the guilds because the professions successfully restrict full competi-
tion (Stiglitz, 2012, p. 54). The professions argue that their aim is to protect consumers 
and clients by maintaining standards. This might be true, but even so, entry restrictions 
(e.g., limiting places at medical schools and immigration of trained personnel) also result 
in higher wage levels. Bol and Weeden (2015, p. 355) accordingly define closure as ‘legal 
and normative barriers [that] restrict the supply of labor to a labor market position and 
protect its incumbents from external competition’. 
Efficient closure devices, in other words, generate monopoly rents, or a wage surplus 
that exceeds the wages that could be collected in a truly competitive market (Sørensen, 
2000). Weeden (2002) identifies four strategies that occupations use to increase wages: 
(1) reducing the labor supply; (2) signaling higher quality of service; (3) channeling 
demand; and (4) increasing demand. This study examines three institutions of occupa-
tional closure: licensure (which reduces supply, signal quality, and channel demand); 
unionization (which reduces labor supply); and credentialization (which reduces supply 
and signal quality).
Licensure
Laws regulate access to licensed occupations, making unauthorized practice of that 
work illegal. Licensure is a true monopoly: only those with licenses have the right to 
perform specific occupational tasks. Licensure and average wages have a positive cor-
relation so that licensed occupations tend to pay higher wages (Bol & Weeden, 2015; 
Humphries et al., 2010; Weeden, 2002). Licensure has stronger effect among the higher 
tiers of the wage distribution, giving greater benefits to already highly paid individuals 
(Weeden 2002; Bol & Drange, 2016; Weeden, 2002). At the same time, licensure can 
reduce internal variability in wages because these occupations are internally less skill-
sensitive, resulting in wages being paid according to position, not productivity (Moore, 
1981). The consumers feel confident that every doctor knows what he or she is doing, 
and the license serves as a state warranted guarantee against lemons in the market. 
Previous research also shows that licensure equalizes internal wage inequality (Bol & 
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Drange, 2016). Thus, we expect to find an equalizing effect of licensure internally within 
occupations (reducing within-occupation differences) and the opposite between occupa-
tions, especially at the top end of the wage distribution.
Unionization
Unionization raises mean wages and compresses wage dispersion, as shown by many 
studies (Rosenfeld, 2014; Wallerstein, 1999). According to Weeden (2002), unionization 
works through the mechanism of restricting supply. Unions do not monopolize occu-
pations as licensure does, but through unions, employees can impose collective wage 
demands on employers. A company with collective agreements has no alternative cheaper 
labor to unionized workers. Generally, unions reduce wage inequality by negotiating at 
the group level, which equalizes within-group pay levels and increases the bargaining 
power among low-paid workers. Card (1998, p. 19), for example, finds that rising union-
ism is ‘a significant force in forestalling rising wage inequality’ in the US public sector.
According to closure theory, unions affect occupational wage levels only if there 
is a correlation between the occupation and the results achieved by the union, and in 
Norway, this is the case. We thus expect to find that unionization has an equalizing 
effect internally within occupations (reducing within-occupation differences) and may 
decrease between-occupation differences, especially at the bottom end of the wage dis-
tribution. The recent decline in the strength of Norwegian unions, as seen, might reduce 
the expected equalizing effect2, especially at the top end of the wage distribution. 
credentialization
Credentialization implies that educational credentials are used as a source of occupa-
tional closure, reserving positions for those with the right amount and type of education 
(Collins, 1979). Clearly then, this device is mostly found in professional and associate 
professional occupations, although some craft and trade occupations also have selective 
educational standards. Credentialization increases mean wages by restricting supply and 
signaling quality of service but does not channel demand to the occupation as licensure 
does (Weeden, 2002), that is, it is not a true monopoly. 
The expected contributions of credentialization to overall, top-end, bottom-end, 
within-occupation, and between-occupation wage inequalities are not as clear-cut 
as the other two closure institutions. Credentialization might have correlations with 
higher wages, so if the number of credentialized groups or the degree of credentializa-
tion increases, then credentialization might contribute to greater between-occupation 
wage inequalities. Whether the more credentialized occupations are able to secure larger 
shares of wage increase is uncertain.
occupational closure and between- and within-occupation  
wage inequalities
In keeping with previous research, then, we expect that the closure devices will correlate 
with higher earnings. But what about the correlation with changes in wage inequality? 
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Differences between occupations can increase in at least two ways.3 First, the size of 
different occupations might change in different directions and at different rates. If 
mid-wage groups (e.g., secretaries) decrease in size, and low- and high-wage groups 
grow bigger, overall wage inequality would increase, even with stable wage differences 
between the occupations.4
Second, the mean wages in different occupations might change (Mouw & Kalleberg, 
2010; Williams, 2013). In this scenario, high-paying occupations get higher wages, and 
low-paying occupations get lower wages. In sum, two features of the occupational clo-
sure institutions are relevant to the present study: their extensiveness and wage effects. 
If the proportion of workers with licenses increases, and licensure increases wages, the 
licensure contributes to between-occupation wage differences through a compositional 
effect. Wages might also rise more rapidly in licensed occupations than nonlicensed 
occupations due to limited supply (a mean wage effect). Kleiner and Krueger (2010) find 
that, in the US, levels of licensing are increasing, while union density is falling. Norway 
presents similar trends, with more regulated occupations (Bol & Drange, 2016) and 
slightly declining union density (Nergaard et al., 2015). Both union density and licen-
sure predict higher wages (Bol & Drange, 2016; Bol & Weeden, 2015; Humphries et al., 
2010; Weeden, 2002). Moreover, the wage premium for licensed occupations is larger 
among professionals (Weeden, 2002) and higher social classes (Bol & Drange, 2016), 
while union density boosts wages at the lower end of the wage distribution (Barth et al., 
2003). These trends suggest that licensure and union density have different impacts on 
the overall distribution of wages. 
Data
We use administrative register data on employment and wages from 2003 to 2012 for 
all residents of Norway born after 1945. The employment data include information on 
occupations, working hours, days of employment, and geographical location of work-
places. This dataset is merged with information from other registers on demographic 
characteristics, education levels, and union membership. Occupational licensure infor-
mation is drawn from the Norwegian Occupational Regulations Database.5 
operationalization of the dependent variable
The dependent variable is the variance of the logarithm (varlog) of gross annual wages 
from employment. Wages are consumer price index adjusted to 2013 levels. To reduce 
the influence of extreme outliers, all observations that exceed 5 million NOK in wages 
(0.35% of observations) are removed. The data do not link wages and employment 
relationships, so annual wages might be gained from multiple employment relation-
ships. Therefore, the sample is restricted to full-time employees (>29 hours a week) with 
contracts covering 11 months of the calendar year. This status increases the likelihood 
that individuals earned the observed annual wages in their primary occupation. Persons 
who are self-employed, unemployed, or enrolled in labor market measures are excluded. 
The sample is limited to persons between the ages of 25 and 67 years. The lower age 
limit eliminates students and apprentices, while the upper age limit is the retirement age. 
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The sample restrictions correspond to those in previous research on wage inequality 
(Mastekaasa, 2011). 
operationalization of occupations
The classification structure for occupations used is STYRK, a Norwegian version of the 
international ISCO−88 code. Occupations are classified by skill level and specialization 
with four levels of detail. The most aggregated level only specifies skill level, ranging 
from unskilled to professionals and managers. The second and third levels also include 
field of work. The fourth level has the highest level of detail and identifies specific 
occupations (e.g., nurses, electricians, police officers). This level is used in the analyses. 
Excluded are the military, legislators, and occupations with fewer than 100 observations 
from 2003 to 2012. The excluded occupations are found among associate professionals, 
technicians, and the craft- and trades occupations. The analysis includes a final total of 
323 occupational groups. 
Private-sector employers have reported occupations since 2003. Public-sector 
employers started using the standardized occupational codes later and earlier reported 
occupational codes from collective wage agreements. These codes are translated into 
STYRK codes based on exact matches of job title or matches based on job title, educa-
tion, and industry. After imputing the codes, occupational information is missing for 
only 5% of employees, mostly consultants, officials, and administrative staff. Missing 
information declines over time and is unlikely to change the general pattern of earnings 
equality or inequality found in the analyses. A strength of the current research, com-
pared with most previous research on between-occupation wage differences, is the abil-
ity to identify the institutions affiliated with rent seeking at the occupational level. Thus, 
this theoretical and methodological approach constitutes a strong design for determin-
ing the impacts of these structural conditions on wage differences.
Independent variables 
The main variables of interest measure different aspects of occupational and social 
closure, specifically licensure, union density, and credentialization. Licensure is mea-
sured at the occupational level as the share of workers within an occupation that hold 
jobs subject to legal regulation. Some occupations have licensing requirements for all 
jobs within the occupation (e.g., medicine), while other occupations have legal require-
ments only for specific jobs (e.g., accounting). Union density measures the share of 
workers in an occupation who belong to unions. Information on union membership is 
collected from tax registers. Finally, the credentialization variable measures the extent to 
which incumbents of an occupation has similar or diverse educational credentials. This 
is a measure of school-to-work linkage developed by DiPrete et al. (2017: appendix A) 
that combines information about education level and field of study and how it relates 
to labor market positions. Occupations whose incumbents have similar levels and types 
of education have a higher score for this variable than occupations with a wide range 
of educational levels. Thus, the higher the score, the more closed the occupation is. The 
analyses also adjust for compositional effects, such as share of female workers and share 
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share of  
immigrants
Mean 0.23 0.57 −0.07 0.39 0.40 0.09
Min. 0 0 −1.58 0 0 0
Max. 1 1 1.93 1 1.00 0.61
Std. dev. 0.39 0.25 0.71 0.34 0.30 0.08
Note: All years combined; N = 11,528,792. HE = higher education.
Table 2 Development in mean occupational closure variables 
year Union density Licensure credentialization
2003 0.58 0.24 −0.02
2004 0.58 0.23 −0.04
2005 0.56 0.21 −0.08
2006 0.58 0.24 −0.05
2007 0.58 0.23 −0.07
2008 0.57 0.23 −0.08
2009 0.56 0.21 −0.11
2010 0.57 0.22 −0.07
2011 0.56 0.23 −0.07
2012 0.56 0.22 −0.07
of workers with immigrant origin. Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the occu-
pational variables. 
Equally interesting for our analysis of changes over time is to see whether there has been 
any development in the closure devices during the period in question. Table 2 summa-
rizes the occupational means of the three closure devices for each year.
Interestingly, Table 2 summarizes a very stable picture over the 10 years we examine. It 
may be that there are some more variations on the occupational level (see Nergaard et al., 
2015, on union density), but in overall averages, the stability is striking. This stability 
gives reason to expect that the possible compositional effect of the occupational closure 
institutions on changing wage inequality is less likely than the mean wage effects.
Methods
In the analyses, we will rely on two different methods: (a) growth curve regressions, and 
(b) unconditional quantile regressions. With the first methods, we are able to decompose 
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the total wage inequality into within- and between-occupation wage inequality, and 
see to what extent both are affected by our measures of occupational closure. With the 
unconditional quantile regressions, we investigate to what extent our measures of occu-
pational closure explain the change in wage inequality at different points of the wage 
distribution from 2003 to 2012.
Growth curve regressions
The variance of log wages is scale invariant and increases in response to wage transfers 
at the lower end of the wage distribution, making it a suitable measure for studying 
wage inequality. The most attractive feature of variance of log wages for this research, 
though, is that it can be decomposed into within- and between-occupation inequality 
(Allison, 1978). 
The analytical approach is based on the framework for studying inequality sug-
gested by Western and Bloome (2009) and similar to that used in previous empirical 
research on this topic (Mouw & Kalleberg, 2010; Williams, 2013). The analysis consists 
of three steps. First, descriptive analysis decomposes the development of wage inequality 
into between- and within-occupation inequality for 2003–2012 separately for men and 
women. The variance in wages (V) is the sum of the variance in wages between occupa-
tions (B) and within occupations (W). This relationship is expressed in equation (1). 
  
V B W






= +∑ ∑2 2σ  (eq. 1)
The between-occupation wage component is the product of the share of employees 
belonging to the occupation j denoted by sj and the square of the deviation of the occu-
pational mean wage from the grand mean rj
2 = (   )jµ µ− . The within-occupation com-
ponent is the product of the share of the employees belonging to occupation j and the 
variance of wages within that occupation j, denoted by σ j
2 .
Next, the extent to which the rise in inequality can be attributed to changes in 
occupational composition (e.g., between-occupation changes: occupations sizes increase 
or decrease, changes in the mean wage effect) and within-occupation effects is analyzed. 
In line with previous research, the models are estimated separately for men and women 
due to the gender-segregated occupational structure. Changes in the log variance of 
wages are the deviation between two points in time (time t0 and time t1), as specified in 
equation 2.
   V V B B W Wt t t t t t1 0 1 0 1 0− = −( )+ −( )  (eq. 2)
Changes in between-occupation wages arise from changes in occupation size and the 
mean wage effect; therefore, the first part of equation 3 consists of, first, the composi-
tional effect and, second, the wage effect. 





2− =∑ −( ) +∑ −( )  (eq. 3)
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Similarly, changes in within-occupation wages are also due to changes in the composi-
tional effect and the variance in wages. 





2− =∑ −( ) +∑ −( )σ σ σ  (eq. 4)
Equation 2 then can be rearranged into three components, where the changes in over-
all log variance of wages are attributable to changes in mean occupational wages ΔB, 
changes in within-occupation wages ΔW, and a composition effect ΔC: 
  V V B W Ct t1 0− = + +∆ ∆ ∆  (eq. 5)
Equations 6–8 show the calculations for the three components from equation 5. 
  ( )∆ =∑ −2 20 1 0 jt jt jtB s r r  (eq. 6)
  ( )σ σ∆ =∑ −2 20 1 0 jt jt jtW s  (eq. 7)
 ( )( )2 21 0 1 1 jt jt jt jtC s s r σ∆ =∑ − +  (eq. 8)
Third, multivariate models are estimated to test whether licensure, union den-
sity, and credentialization can explain some of between- and within-occupation wage 
inequality. The estimation of multivariate models combines the approaches of Mouw 
and Kalleberg (2010) using individual-level data and Williams (2013, pp. 845–846) 
using occupational-level data. A standard regression model of mean log wages is first 
estimated as a function of both individual-level covariates and occupational fixed-effects 
(eq. 9). This is done for the 2003–2012 period to determine how much individual-level 
characteristics explain between- and within-occupation wage inequality. 
 β α ε= + +1ln    
j
ij ij j i ijwage X occ  (eq. 9)
ln wageij is the log of the wages for person i in occupation j. X is a vector of individual 
covariates that include eight dummy variables for education level, gender, and age, as 
well as the interaction between gender and age and gender and education level. αj is the 
occupational fixed-effects, and εij is the error term. The model is estimated as a fixed-
effect regression with individuals nested in occupations. The post-estimation tools are 
used to extract from the analysis the occupational fixed effects, which now measure the 
mean occupational wages adjusted for compositional effects. 
Next, the squared residuals from equation 9, εij , are used in the model for the vari-
ance. Again, the variance is estimated with individual-level covariates and occupational 
fixed effects simultaneously. 
 2 1log    
j
ij ij j i ijX occσ β γ ω= + +  (eq. 10)
X is a vector containing the same individual-level covariates as equation 9 because 
gender, education, and age also affect the variance. This model is also estimated as a 
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fixed-effects regression, and the occupational level effects are recovered, as in equation 9. 
The analyses in equations 9 and 10 are repeated for each year of data. This new 
dataset has a two-level structure with repeated observations nested within occupations. 
The data consist of 323 occupations observed for a maximum of 10 years, creating an 
unbalanced panel with 3168 observations. 
Next, the mean log wages fixed-effects αj and the within-occupation variance 
fixed-effects γj estimated in equations 9 and 10 are used as the dependent variables 
for the multivariate growth-curve models. Growth-curve models are specified to serve 
the research interest in the development of wage inequality. The model estimation is a 
two-level model with occupation-years nested in occupations. The regressions uses the 
occupational level data from the first-stage regressions 9 and 10. The modeling follows 
Kim and Sakamoto (2008, pp. 136–137). The model for between-occupation inequality 
is as follows:
 α β β εjt jt jtYear= + +0 1   (eq. 11)
 α β β β β β θ θjt jt tj j jt j j jYear x x Year x w w= + + + + ( )+ +*0 1 2 3 4 1 2 t jt+ε   (eq. 12)
The model for within-occupation inequality is as follows: 
 γ β β εjt jt jtYear= + +0 1   (eq. 13)
 γ β β β β β θ θjt jt tj j jt j j jYear x x Year x w w= + + + + ( )+ +*0 1 2 3 4 1 2 t jt+ε   (eq. 14)
The baseline models (eq. 11 and eq. 13) contain only the intercept β0, a yearly growth 
curve β1 and the error term εjt, where εjt = (ξj + ϕjt). ξj is the occupational-specific error 
term and ϕjt is an idiosyncratic error term. 
The next set of models (eq. 12 and eq. 14) has five additional estimators: β2, β3, and 
β4 and controls θ1 and θ2. The coefficient β2 gives the effect of the occupational specific 
closure measure, xjt, (proportion of licensed workers, proportion of union organized 
workers, and linkage strength), and shows whether changes in the occupational closure 
variables are associated with changes in the mean occupational wages (eq. 12) or within-
occupational variances (eq. 14). Coefficient β3 gives the effect of the occupational aver-
age of each closure device, jx , and shows variation in wage inequality associated with 
the closure devices. Coefficient β4 is the interaction effect between the occupational aver-
age and year, and predicts whether the changes to returns in occupational closure have 
increased or decreased over time, net of the effects associated with change in strength of 
occupational closure. Hence, an increase in the returns from licensure during the period 
studied results in a positive β4-estimator. An increase in the share of licensed workers 
might also lead to higher wage inequality, as observed by the β2-estimator.
The vectors wjt and jw  contain the control variables that are the proportion of 
females and immigrants in the occupation and the average composition of females and 
immigrants in the occupation. Thus, θ1 predict the change in wage inequality associ-
ated with changes in the proportion of females and immigrants, net of the average 
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composition of females and immigrants in the occupations given by θ2. 
A consequence of the two-step method is that the components of the closure vari-
ables that correlate with individual characteristics in the first step is attributed to the 
individual variables, which would produce more conservative estimates for the closure 
variables. This is not problematic, as closure should be beneficiary to all workers in the 
occupation, irrespective of education level etc.
Unconditional quantile regression
We also examine the effects on changes in wage inequality from the three closure charac-
teristics studied (licensure, unionization, and credentialization). Unconditional quantile 
regressions (Firpo et al., 2009) are used to assess the influence of these three occupa-
tional institutions at different points of the wage distribution. Unconditional quantile 
regressions involves calculating a recentred influence function (RIF) for each quantile of 
interest, which we will then use as dependent variables in linear regression. In contrast 
to conditional quantile regression, RIFs have an unconditional interpretation and are 
therefore not based on other covariates in the model. This means that one is able to 
decompose changes in wage differentials between two time points into a composition 
effect (i.e., changes in the levels of occupational closure) and a wage effect (i.e., changes 
in the wages attached to occupational closure) using a Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposi-
tion. Wage effects refer to the higher returns under a closure institution for some groups 
in the wage distribution. Closure institutions might also effect changes in aggregate 
inequality when the share of workers within an institution differs across the distribu-
tion. Licensure, for example, might raise wages either because the returns from licensure 
are higher for high-earnings workers (wage structure effects) or because licensed occu-
pations have more high-earning workers (composition effects).
In line with earlier studies, we use a counterfactual reweighting procedure (Fortin 
et al., 2011). Composition effects are the effects obtained from a decomposition compar-
ing 2003 to the reweighted 2003 (weighted to 2012 based on all variables). Wage effects 
are the effects obtained from a decomposition comparing 2012 with the reweighted 
2003. The error from the reweighting procedure is then the composition effect from this 
latter decomposition.
We examine the change in wages at three points in the distribution: the 10th, the 
50th, and the 90th percentiles. This will indicate how closure has affected changes in 
wages at different points in the distribution, and therefore wage inequality. 
Descriptive results
Trends in wage inequality for men
Figure 1 presents the development in wage inequality from 2003 to 2012 among full-
time employed men. Inequality increases in this period, as evident from the rising slopes 
from 2003 to 2012. The overall level of wage inequality, represented by the solid line, 
rises by 22% [(0.169–0.138)/0.138]. Although this is an increase, it should be noted 
that the wage inequality in Norway is comparatively quite modest at the starting 
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point in 2003. The variance in log wages for Norway in 2003 is less than one-third of 
the variance in log wages for the US (Mouw & Kalleberg, 2010, p. 412) and the UK 
(Williams, 2013, p. 844). 
In addition to the general trend in the variance in log wages, Figure 1 shows the 
decomposition of within- and between-occupation variance. Within-occupation vari-
ance is clearly more important than between-occupation variance to the overall variance 
in wages. Approximately two-thirds of the total variance in wages is between workers 
within the same occupational categories, and one-third between the average earnings of 
different occupations. 
Figure 1 also reports the changes in the two types of wage inequality. When looking 
at the figure, the slope for the between-occupation wage inequality seems steeper. This 
steep slope is even more visible in Figure 2, which shows changes in the relative contri-
butions of within- and between-occupation wage inequality. The increase in between-
occupational inequality is stronger than the increase in within-occupation inequality 
during the period studied. From 2003 to 2012, the variance in mean occupational wages 
increases by 31% [(0.065−0.049)/0.049], and the variance in within-occupation wages 
by 17% [(0.104−0.089)/0.089]. 
Figure 2 indicates the proportion of overall inequality explained by occupations. 
The variance in between-occupational wages becomes more important to explaining 
overall variance in wages during the 10 years studied, as evidenced by the narrowing gap 
between the within- and between occupation slopes. Between-occupational inequality’s 
Figure 1:  Wage inequality (overall, within-, and between-occupation) 2003–2012, full-time 
employed men.
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explanatory power for overall inequality increases by a modest 2.5 percentage points. 
Wage differences between workers in the same occupations are still much more impor-
tant than the average wage differences between occupations. 
In the second stage of analysis, the changes in overall inequality are further decom-
posed into changes in mean occupational wages, within-occupation wages, and com-
position effects. The variance of log wages increases by 0.0308, of which changes in 
mean occupational wages account for 44% (0.0136/0.0308), changes in the variance 
of within-occupation wages 42% (0.0128/0.0308), and composition effects 14% 
(0.0043/0.0308). Thus, changes in wages between occupations and greater variation in 
wages within occupations equally contribute to rising wage inequality levels in Norway, 
while the changes to composition explain only a small share.
Trends in wage inequality for women
Figure 3 presents the development of wage inequality from 2003 to 2012 among full-
time employed women. The overall level of wage inequality, represented by the solid 
Figure 2: Between- and within-occupation inequality as a proportion of overall inequality, full-time 
employed men.
Table 3 Decomposition of inequality for full-time employed men
V2012–V2003 ∆ B ∆ w ∆ c
2003–2012 0.0308 0.0136 0.0128 0.0043
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Figure 3: Wage inequality (overall, within-, and between-occupation), 2003–2012, full-time employed 
women.
Figure 4: Between- and within-occupation inequality as a proportion of overall inequality, full-time 
employed women.
line, increases by 12% [(0.109−0.097)/0.097], the variance in mean occupational wages 
by 21% [(0.046−0.038)/0.038], and the variance in wages within occupations by 8% 
[(0.064−0.059)/0.059]. Figure 4 presents the proportion of overall inequality among 
women explained by occupations. The pattern is the same as for men, but the convergence 
of within- and between-occupational wages is more pronounced. The explanatory power of 
between-occupational inequality for overall inequality increases by 2.3 percentage points. 
The analysis shows that changes in mean occupational wages account for 54% 
(0.0068/0.0125) of the changes in overall variance of log wages, changes in the 
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variance of within-occupation wages 27% (0.0034/0.0125), and composition effects 
18% (0.0043/0.0125). Compared with the results for men, a larger share of the rise 
in inequality among women lies between occupations or in the composition of the 
occupational structure. However, the main conclusion again is that both within- and 
between-occupation wage inequalities contribute equally to the modest change in Nor-
wegian wage inequality, in this case for women. 
effects of occupational closure
Between-occupational wage inequality 
The second stage of analysis investigates whether between- and within-occupation wage 
inequality is related to union density, licensure, and credentialization. Can these occupa-
tional institutions explain the changes in wage inequality in Norway? 
Occupational closure can affect changes in mean occupational wages through a 
change in the proportion of workers in closed occupations, or by a change in the impor-
tance of the closure device for wage setting. The wage response to proportional change 
is given by the coefficients for licensure, union density, and credentialization. The inter-
action between year and the occupational average of each closure device tells whether 
the device has become more or less important for wage setting, net of changes in the 
proportion of workers covered by the device. 
The analyses in Table 5 display wage responses to the closure devices separately 
(model 2 – model 4) and adjusted for the other devices (model 5). Thus, this model 
shows the unique contribution of each device, net of the wage effect of the other devices. 
The final model includes controls for gender and immigrant composition (model 6).
Table 5 presents the results from the multivariate growth models for the develop-
ment of log mean wages. Model 1 only includes the time trend and shows that mean 
occupational wages increase by 2.3% per year, supporting the results of the descriptive 
models. The next model shows the results of licensure. Both the occupational-specific 
mean and the occupational-specific changes in licensure are positive, but insignificant. 
The interaction term shows that wages in licensed occupations increase by 0.4% per 
year, net of changes in the proportion of licensed workers, yielding a total wage increase 
of 4.0% for licensed occupations over the 10 years studied. Because the association 
between licensure and wages might be different in high- or low-paying occupations, 
the wage response to changes in proportion of licensed workers and the change in the 
importance of licensure were tested with interactions for high wage and low wage occu-
pations (defined as occupations with mean wages 1 std. above or below the mean wage). 
The results revealed that high wage occupations received a larger wage premium over 
time and larger wage premiums from compositional change (results not shown). 
The third model shows the results for union density. The occupational-specific mean 
is negative and significant. A negative coefficient indicates that union density reduces 
Table 4 Decomposition of inequality for full-time employed women
V2012−V2003 ∆ B ∆ w ∆c
2003–2012 0.0125 0.0068 0.0034 0.0023
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Table 5 Between-occupational wage regression
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se)
Year 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.025***
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
OA licensure 0.039 0.050 0.026
0.036 0.039 0.035
Licensure 0.010 −0.016 −0.020
0.013 0.012 0.012
Year* OA licensure 0.004*** 0.002** 0.001
0.001 0.001 0.001
OA union density −0.105* −0.126* −0.091*
0.046 0.051 0.045
Union density 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.109***
0.014 0.014 0.014
Year* OA union 
density 0.005*** 0.001 0.000
0.001 0.001 0.001
OA credentialization 0.071*** 0.064** 0.060***
0.018 0.020 0.018
Credentialization −0.051*** −0.052*** −0.040***
0.008 0.008 0.008
Year * Credentializa-










OA proportion  
immigrants −0.757***
0.120
Cons 12.655*** 12.648*** 12.624*** 12.653*** 12.631*** 12.791***
0.011 0.012 0.027 0.011 0.028 0.030
Level 2 var(cons) 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.029***
Level 1 var(cons) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
Multivariate growth models for log mean occupational wages (aj). Fulltime employed women and men 
aged 25–67 years.
OA = occupational average, ~ p ≤ 0.10, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001, N = 3110, n = 11,528,792
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between-occupational wage inequality. The coefficient for change in proportion of union 
members β2 is positive and significant. If union density rises by 100%, the mean wage 
increases by 14.4%, and vice versa, the mean wage decreases with declining union den-
sity. The net effect of union density across time is positive, so the mean wages of union-
ized occupations increased by 5.0% over the 10 years studied. Again, the association 
between union density and wages might be different in high- or low-paying occupations. 
The interactions for high wage and low wage occupations revealed that in high wage 
occupations, wages increased with rising union density and the return to union density 
also increased, net of proportional change. In low wage occupations, an increase in the 
proportion of unionized workers gave a smaller wage premium and lower returns to 
union density, compared with higher paid occupations (results not shown).
Model 4 shows the results for credentialization. The occupational-specific mean is 
positive and significant and shows that occupations with highly selective educational 
standards pay higher wages. A one-point increase in the log linkage measure produces 
6.9% higher wages. The coefficient for change in an occupation’s credentialization mea-
sure β2 is negative and significant, indicating that the mean wage decreases by 5.0% 
for occupations that become more strongly linked to specific educations. Over the 
10 years, the returns for credentialization, net of change in the strength of education-to-
occupation linkage, also increase slightly, producing 1.0% higher wages by 2012. There 
is an additional premium to high wage occupations in response to changes in linkage 
strength and in the returns to linkage across time, but among low wage occupations, an 
additional wage premium is associated with an increase in the strength of credentializa-
tion only (results not shown).
The final model shows the results from the jointly specified model. The changes in 
the coefficients are small, indicating that the effects from the previous model persist, 
with the exception of the time trend for union density. 
The error variances at the bottom of Table 5 show the variance of level 2 errors (ξj) 
and level 1 errors (ϕjt). The error variance at level 2 decreases in model 2–4 compared 
with the baseline model. This implies that the closure variables are able to explain very 
little of the variation in mean occupational wages. 
within-occupation wage inequality 
Table 6 presents the results for the models measuring changes in residual variance, or 
wage variance within occupations. The table set-up is similar to Table 5, with each 
device presented separately (model 2–4) and adjusted for the other devices (model 5). 
Model 5 shows the unique contribution of each device, net of the other devices. Model 6 
adds control for gender and immigrant composition and compositional change. 
The first model shows that the within-occupation wage inequality decreases by 
3.0% from 2003 to 2012. In the second model, inequality falls by 3.3% in occupa-
tions with higher proportions of licensed incumbents, and wages in licensed occupa-
tions show a tendency toward convergence over the 10 years. The associations between 
licensure and within-occupation wage variance are similar across high and low-paying 
occupations.
The third model shows that union density largely decreases within-occupation 
wage variation. Occupations with high union density generally have lower levels of 
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Table 6 Within-occupational wage regression
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se)
Year −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.001** −0.003*** −0.001~ −0.002***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
OA licensure 0.000 0.041* 0.041*
0.019 0.018 0.019
Licensure −0.035*** −0.024* −0.023*
0.009 0.009 0.009
Year* OA licensure −0.001 −0.000 0.000
0.000 0.001 0.001
OA union density −0.079*** −0.074** −0.087***
0.022 0.024 0.024
Union density −0.082*** −0.078*** −0.063***
0.010 0.011 0.011
Year* OA union density −0.003*** −0.004*** −0.003***
0.001 0.001 0.001
OA credentialization −0.023* −0.004 0.002
0.010 0.010 0.010
Credentialization −0.010~ −0.011* −0.016**
0.006 0.006 0.006








OA proportion  
immigrants −0.004
0.059
cons 0.097*** 0.102*** 0.190*** 0.100*** 0.183*** 0.188***
0.005 0.006 0.012 0.005 0.012 0.015
Level 2 var(cons) 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007***
Level 1 var(cons) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
Multivariate growth models for the within-occupation variance in wages (γj  ). Full-time employed women 
and men aged 25–67 years.
OA = occupational average, ~ p ≤ 0.10, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001, N = 3110, n = 11,528,792
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wage inequality, and as union density increases in occupations, wage inequality declines. 
These trends seem logical because occupations with high union membership levels are 
more likely to have wage bargaining for (groups of) occupational workers. Moreover, 
the interaction term between union density and time is negative and significant, which 
implies that the residual wage inequality in unionized occupations was lower in 2012 
than 2003. Additional analyses show that the reduction in residual variance in response 
to higher proportions of unionized workers is less strong in high wage occupations 
(results not shown). 
The fourth model shows that occupations with high shares of workers with similar 
education have lower residual wage inequality. However, occupations that adopt stricter 
educational standards do not develop more similar wages, and residual wage dispersion 
does not decrease in credentialized occupations over the 10 years studies. This result 
indicates that credentialization reduces within-occupation wage variance (see DiPrete et 
al., 2017), but the effect does not change over time. The associations between linkage 
strength and within-occupation wage variance is similar across high and low-paying 
occupations.
The fifth model shows that occupations with stronger licensing actually have sig-
nificantly higher wage dispersion after adjusting for union density and credentialization. 
Still, occupations that increase their share of licensed practitioners have less growth in 
inequality than occupations that reduce their share of licensed practitioners. The coef-
ficients for union density remain largely unchanged by the joint specification of the 
model. Credentialized occupations have lower wage inequality, but the estimate is no 
longer significant. Model 6 adds controls for gender and immigrant composition and 
compositional change. The addition of the controls does not substantially alter the coef-
ficients of the closure variables. 
The error variance at level 2 decreases in model 3–6, compared with the baseline 
model, but again, the closure variables explain very little of the residual variation in 
wages. 
Unconditional quantile regressions
The final empirical step more formally investigates to what extent occupational closure 
affects changes in wage inequality in Norway from 2003 to 2012. Unconditional quantile 
regressions examine the effects of explanatory variables at different points in the wage 
distribution, and thus compliments the previous analyses of changes to overall inequality. 
Differences at various points in the wage distribution from 2003 to 2012 are decomposed 
into the contributions of the explanatory variables. We assess the extent to which the 
three forms of occupational closure affect changes in the wage distribution. A benefit 
of unconditional quantile regression is that it enables analyzing to what extent changes 
in wages at different points in the wage distribution are due to composition effects or 
wage structure effects. Table 7 summarizes the results of the RIF regressions and Oaxaca-
Blinder decompositions. We examine the 10th, 50th, and 90th quantiles of log wages. 
In the table, the total difference refers to the total change in log wages at the mentioned 
quantiles. This total difference is then decomposed in wage and composition effects.
The first row of Table 7 presents the total difference in mean log annual wages 
for workers in the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles. Here, it is evident that workers 
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throughout the distribution see higher annual wages. As well, the increased wage inequal-
ity in Norway is due to more rapidly increasing wages for those at the upper part than 
the bottom of the wage distribution. In other words, inequality grows because the right 
tail sees a more rapid increase in wages than the left tail.
This may have occurred due to both composition and wage structure effects. The 
analyses show that composition effects play only a minor role throughout the distribu-
tion. In the 90th percentile, compositional shifts account 13% (0.055/0.430) of the total 
change in wages between 2003 and 2012 and even less in other percentiles. The only 
compositional factor that plays a role is education, indicating that (a very small) part of 
the reason why the 50th and 90th percentiles earn more in 2012 than in 2003, is that 
they have more highly educated workers. Moreover, all three occupational closure indi-
cators have no compositional effect.
Wage structure effects contribute the most to wage growth in all percentiles. The 
total wage structure effect is largest for the 90th percentile, indicating that higher 
returns are the primary reason why this group earns more in 2012 than 2003. First, 
much of these effects lie in the constant, indicating that the selected covariates cannot 
explain some difference in the mean wages between 2003 and 2012. However, the wage 
structure effects of the covariates do explain part of the difference. First, the returns 
from age increase for the lowest decile, whereas the returns from education decrease. 
Gender plays a minor role in the changes in wage inequality in Norway. Of the occu-
pational closure covariates, the returns from unionization increase, but mostly for the 
Table 7 Oaxaca Blinder decomposition using RIF regressions, 2003–2012
10th percentile 50th percentile 90th percentile
Total difference (2012–2003) 0.308 0.376 0.430
Composition −0.009 0.027 0.055
 Age −0.026 0.003 0.013
 Female 0.002 0.001 0.002
 Education 0.013 0.022 0.041
 Licensure 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Credentialization 0.001 0.000 0.000
 Unionization 0.002 0.000 0.000
Wage structure 0.317 0.350 0.375
 Constant 0.250 0.144 0.270
 Age 0.153 0.073 0.049
 Female 0.020 0.028 −0.013
 Education −0.235 0.055 0.000
 Licensure −0.005 −0.005 −0.011
 Unionization 0.134 0.053 0.079
 Credentialization 0.002 0.002 0.000
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lowest decile, mitigating the (potentially large) growth in wage inequality. The main con-
clusion from the results of the unconditional quantile regressions is that occupational 
closure strategies play only a minor role in explaining recent trends in wage inequality 
in Norway. 
conclusion 
This article examines the development in wage inequality in Norway and the role played 
by occupations. Is the growth in wage inequality in Norway—as in more liberal market 
economies—primarily due to increased wage differentials between occupations? Second, 
we investigate what specific aspects of occupations correlate with (changes in) wage 
inequality in Norway, focusing on three forms of institutional closure: licensure, creden-
tialization, and unionization. 
First, the results show that inequality increases from 2003 to 2012 and that higher 
between-occupational wage inequality account for most of the increase. In other words, 
the differences between mean occupational wages rise over these 10 years, and occupa-
tions are a more important predictor of workers’ wages in 2012 than 2003. Neverthe-
less, the changes are small: only a 2% increase in between-occupational inequality per 
year. The analyses also reveal, however, that the within-occupation wage inequality is 
more important to overall variance and accounts for two-thirds of the total variance in 
wages. Even if Norway has relatively low inequality levels, its national trends are quite 
similar to those in liberal market economies such as the UK and the US. Our results are 
comparable to Dale-Olsen and Østbakken (2016) who found a slight increase in the 
overall wage inequality in Norway in 2002–2012, and a moderate increase in the top 
end of the wage distribution.
Second, this study examines the relationships of three forms of occupational clo-
sure to (changes in) wage inequality, particularly whether licensure, credentialization, 
and unionization can explain the (growing) earnings differences between and within 
occupations. The results show that the relative returns from licensure, as well as union 
density and credentialization, increase during this period, thus leading to larger between-
occupational wage inequality. Conversely, the closure institutions is associated with 
lower within-occupational inequality. 
The results for the unconditional quantile regression indicate that these increasing 
returns are quite stable across different parts of the wage distribution, with a somewhat 
stronger increase in the top-end of the wage distribution. Our analyses also indicate that 
the closure devices mainly work through differences in mean wages, and that composi-
tion effects play only a minor role in the development. 
In general, the three forms of occupational closure contribute to increase between-
occupational inequality and decreased within-occupation inequality. The move toward 
more local and individual-level wage bargaining from peak associations for professional 
labor does not change the overall effect of unions to equalize within inequality, at least 
not in this decade. The effects, however, are not dramatic, and the unconditional quan-
tile regression shows that occupational closure plays only a minor role in explaining 
recent trends in Norwegian wage inequality. 
The results indicate that occupational closure helps to understand trends in wage 
inequality, although it is important to acknowledge that multiple factors affect changes 
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in wage differences6. The results show that occupations contribute to the explanation 
and are an important unit of analysis to understand why some people earn (increasingly) 
more than others do. While occupational closure is important for wage returns, its role 
in explaining overtime change in wage inequality in Norway is rather small.
Wage inequality is not the only source of inequality; inequality of wealth is consid-
erably larger (Piketty, 2014). So, if we had used an income measure that also includes 
income from capital (like Dale-Olsen & Østbakken, 2016, do), we would probably have 
found larger differences. Still, comparatively, wage inequality in Norway is not high, and 
the labor market institutions contributing to a compressed wage structure still seem to 
be effective. The development described in the analyses, however, indicates an ongoing 
shift toward greater wage inequalities that might eventually change the Nordic model 
(Dølvik et al., 2015). 
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endnotes
1   This, of course, is not the only source of inequality and certainly not the most important when it comes 
to ‘the top 1 percent’ of wealth. As Piketty (2014) writes, ‘inequality of wealth—and of the consequent 
income from capital—is in fact always much greater than inequality of income from labor’ (p. 40).
2   This might contribute to explaining increasing inequality between occupations if reduced unionization 
resulted in increasing differences between the occupations still unionized and those with weakened 
unions. However, alternatively, replacing collective bargaining with individual wage negotiations likely 
increases within-occupation differences.
3   Our discussion below has much in common with the literature on job polarisation [e.g., Adermon & 
Gustavsson (2015), Goos et al. (2014), or Katz & Autor (1999)]. Our main point here is not to review 
different explanations on this phenomenon, but to spell out the two main ways wage differences 
between occupations may change.
4   Such changes in the composition of the US labour force are described by Autor et al. (2005).
5   The Research Council of Norway (grant no. 237039) finances the Norwegian Occupational Regula-
tions Database. Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences collect and distribute the 
data. These institutions are not responsible for the current analyses and interpretations of the data.
6   The regression analyses adjust for observed individual characteristics, i.e. education, gender, and age, 
but not for unobserved individual heterogeneity, such as ability or productivity that might affect 
between- and within-occupational wage inequality.
